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THE  POLITICAL  ALIGNMENT  OF  THE  CENTRE 
PARTY  IN  WILHELMINE  GERMANY: 
A  STUDY  OF  THE  PARTY'S  EMERGENCE  IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY  WURTTEMBERG 
By  DAVID  BLACKBOURN 
Jesus College, Cambridge 
LESS  than  a  month  before Bismarck's dismissal as German  chancellor, the 
Reichstag  elections of  February I890  destroyed the  parliamentary majority 
of  the Kartell parties -  National  Liberals and Conservatives -  with  whose 
support he had governed. The number of Reichstag seats held by these parties 
fell from 22I  to I40, out of the total of397; they never again achieved more than 
I69. To the multitude of problems left by Bismarck to his successors  was there- 
fore added one of parliamentary  arithmetic: how was the chancellor to organize 
a Reichstag majority when the traditional governmental parties by themselves 
were no  longer large enough, and the intransigently anti-governmental SPD 
was constantly increasing its representation? It was in  this situation that the 
role of the Centre party in  Wilhelmine politics became decisive, for between 
I890  and I9I4 the party possessed a quarter of the seats in the Reichstag, and 
thus held the balance  of power between Left and Right. 
The impact which the Centre would have made by aligning itself with the 
left-wing  parties -  Progressives and SPD  -  was clearly demonstrated later: 
during the war, when  these three parties moved firmly against the imperial 
government by supporting Erzberger's Peace Resolution in  I9I7;  and in  the 
I920S,  when the same three parties  provided the backbone  of Weimar democracy. 
Centre, Progressives and SPD  together had a potential parliamentary  majority 
at all times between I890  and I9I4. An  alliance during that period might not 
have wrung immediate concessions from the Kaiser and his ministers; but it 
would  have  subjected the  autocratic constitutional practices of  the Reich  to 
severe and permanent pressure. Such a German parallel to the 'Gladstonian 
Coalition' 1 of Celtic fringe, progressive middle-class and urban workers might 
have forced ministers from its own ranks on the Kaiser, twenty years before 
war eventually brought this about:  it would certainly have called the hand of 
those in governmental circles who threatened a coup d'etat. 
The  Centre, however, chose to join forces with  the Progressives and SPD 
1 Cf.  A.  Rosenberg, Imperial Germany, translated by I. F.  D.  Morrow (London, I93I),  p.  I8. 
The possibility of such a coalition was regarded as a major danger by Bismarck, and by his suc- 
cessors, like Hohenlohe. C. zu Hohenlohe, Denkwiirdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit,  ed. K. A.  von 
Muller (Stuttgart,  I93I),  p.  45I  f. 822  DAVID  BLACKBOURN 
only sporadically  before I9I4  -  in opposition to the 'big'  military bill of i893, 
and over the Zabern affair of  I9I3-I4,  for example. For  the most part, the 
Centre abandoned its  former  anti-governmental stance. Encouraged by  the 
greater warmth  which  Bismarck's successors showed  towards it,  the  party 
ch-anged  course from the early i89os,  and under the leadership of Ernst Lieber 
and Peter Spahn generally threw its support behind the old Kartell partners  on 
the  Right,  particularly the  Conservatives, rather than  the Left.  The  Centre 
became a 'party of government'  (Regierungspartei), on whose  ioo Reichstag 
votes successive  chancellors depended. It was the mainstay of Caprivi's admini- 
stration; it supported Hohenlohe's government as it moved to the right during 
the later i89os;  it supported the Samnmlunigspolitik  of Miquel and Billow from 
the turn of the century; and, after a brief, involuntary exclusion from the pro- 
governmental alliance of Kartell plus Progressives in  1907-9,  it returned to its 
role as supporter of the status quo and the Conservatives. This article will  try 
to suggest some of the issues which divided the Centre from Progressives and 
SPD, and led it to favour a pro-Conservative  course. 
I 
The Centre party of the Second Reich has usually been regarded simply as a 
clerical  party, led by a series of able tacticians who maintained electoral loyalty 
by appealing to a confessional siege mentality, and in turn bartered  support for 
the government of the day against concessions to Catholic schools and teaching 
orders.2  Certainly this feature of  the party was most apparent in  the Kultur- 
kampf  of  the  I870s,  as  the  Centre  sought  to  defend  the  Church  against 
Josephinism; and it  was in  these years that German Catholics, forced into  a 
Prussian-based  Reich  in  which  they were  outnumbered two  to  one  by Pro- 
testants,  deserted the parties for which they had previously voted and first gave 
their allegiance to the Centre. In the Rhineland elections to the Prussian Lower 
House the Liberals had received 6o per cent of the vote in I863,  as against only 
8 per cent for the Catholic party. After  i87I  this area voted soldily for  the 
Centre.3  By the time of the I874  Reichstag election, at the height of the Kultur- 
kampf, the party was able to win  28  per cent of all votes cast, and 8o per cent 
of those  cast by German Catholics.4 
But the Centre was not just a clerical party, and this is well illustrated by 
its ihostility towards attempts by Rome and the German bishops to dictate its 
policy towards Reich military bills. As early as i88o, Rome had suggested that 
2  A classic contemporary  statement of this view is that of Hans Delbrkick,  that the Centre was a 
party ' held together solely by the interests of the Catholic Church and the masterly parliamentary 
tactics of Herr Windthorst  '. Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  65 (Feb. I890),  pp.  236-7.  Cf. A. J. P. Taylor, 
The Course  of German  History (London, I962  ed.), pp.  I63-4,  I72. 
3 Rosenberg,  Imperial  Germnany,  p. 28,  fn.  2. 
4  R. Morsey, ' Die deutschen Katholiken und der Nationalstaat zwischen Kulturkampf und dem 
ersten Weltkrieg ', Historisches  Jahrbuch  (I970), p. 35. THE  CENTRE  PARTY  IN  WORTTEMBERG  823 
a  favourable Centre  attitude  towards  Bismarck's  seven-year military  bill 
(Septennat) might lead to a reduction of Kulturkanmpf  measures; but the Centre 
chairman, Franckenstein, made it clear that the party was political, and inde- 
pendent of clerical  influence.5  In i887,  when the Septennat  came up for renewal, 
Bismarck tried to put pressure on the Centre through Rome to  support the 
bill. A note was passed to Centre leaders  Franckenstein and Windthorst through 
th;e  papal nuncio in Munich, di Pietro, urging Centre acceptance  of the measure 
in  the interests of  the Church. The  reply, once again, was an unambiguous 
statement of Centre party autonomy in  all political matters, and a refusal to 
modify its opposition to the Septennat.6  In I893,  faced with the need to secure 
Centre support for his 'big'  military bill,  Caprivi also failed with  the same 
ploy. Cardinal Kopp, a favoured intermediary in negotiations between Berlin 
and the Vatican, and Ballestrem, a conservative Silesian member of the Centre, 
went to Rome while the bill was being discussed. They returned reporting that 
the pope would like to see the bill passed, and recommended discussions  between 
Centre leaders and the German bishops. If the bishops were divided, the party 
was to heed the advice of those who  were more experienced in such matters; 
a clear hint from Rome that the pro-bill position of Kopp was more favourable 
in its eyes than the anti-bill attitude of men like Bishop Krementz of Cologne. 
Centre leaders, especially Ernst Lieber, were incensed by this further attempt 
at interference, and once again -the  overtures were disregarded.7  From this date 
the party steered an increasingly political course which owed nothing to clerical 
prompting. German  Catholics who  enjoyed the  ear of  the  Curia were  far 
removed from power in the party, whose leaders in turn had little or no contact 
with Rome:  Windthorst never went there, Lieber only once.8 
This  emphasis on  the Centre as a political party was not new:  from  the 
outset in I870  the party's  principal  founders, Peter Reichensperger  and Hermann 
von Mallinckrodt, were anxious to avoid the mistakes of  the Catholic party 
which had sat in  the Prussian Lower House  from  I852,  and in their opinion 
emasculated itself by pursuing a narrow clericalism. Hence 'their  insistence on 
the name 'Centre',  and the inclusion within the programme of a full range of 
5  Stadtarchiv'  (SA) Kbln, Karl Bachem Nachlass, I006/55. 
6 Cf.  the memoranda of  Karl Bachem, dealing with  the reactions of  the Centre leadership to 
the  crisis, and  the  discussions on  the  Reichstag parliamentary group,  SA  Kbln,  Karl Bachern 
Nachlass, Ioo6/56,  ioo6/6ib.  Also E.  Hiisgen, Luddwig  Windthorst (Cologne,  I9II),  pp.  23I-2; 
G. von Hertling, Erinneruingen  aus m2einern  Leben, 2  vols. (Munich, I9I9-20),  II,  64-6. 
7  Cf.  Bachem memoranda, SA K6lin, Karl Bachem Nachlass I006/56,  ioo6/66c;  Schaedler to 
Lieber, 20  June I893,  Pfdlzische Landesbibliothek, Speyer,  Ernst Lieber Nachlass, S.  I95.  The 
near unanimity of  Centre politicians on  this issue can be  seen not  only  in  the  memoranda and 
letters of the bill's opponents, such as Lieber, Karl Bachem and Schaedler. It also emerges clearly 
from the diary accounts of Frank Ballestrem, one of  the few  who  urged a more pliant line.  Cf. 
especially folder IX of  the unpublished papers of  Franz Ballestrem, in  private family possession. 
I  should like  to  express my  gratitude to  the  Ballestrem family  for  allowing  me  access to  this 
material. 
8  Morsey, Die deutschen  Katholiken, p. 45. 824  DAVID  BLACKBOURN 
policies supporting the rights of  the individual  states within  the Reichl, the 
democratic franchise, the demand for more local self-government and social 
reforms. A  number of Catholic deputies in fact refused to join the new party, 
while a number of Protestants,  of whom the most noteworthy was Ludwig von 
Gerlach, did so.9 The  tacit sympathy of  many Protestant Conservatives was 
aroused by the severity of Liberal attacks on the Catholic Church during the 
Kulturkampf, and this fund of sympathy was frequently drawn on in subsequent 
years. In 1907,  when Biilow tried to resurrect  the Kartell alliance against Centre 
and SPD Reichsfeinde by enlisting the support of the Progressives as a gcovern- 
mental party, -the Conservative Kretizzeittung came out openly against attack- 
ing  its  ' natural allies ' in  the Centre,10 and local electoral agreements were 
concluded between the two which cut across the divisions of the Billow block."1 
This  Conservative sympathy was reciprocated. Windthorst's own  aim was 
always the establishment of  a  ' Christian Conservative party ',  and after his 
death in  i8gi  the need to break out of the confessional ghetto was even more 
openly acknowledged by influential groups within  the party, especially those 
gathered around Julius Bachem in  Cologne,  and the Social Catholics of  the 
Mdnchen-Gladbach school,  which  favoured non-confessional Christian trade 
unions. By I9I4  these opinions had the upper hand in the Centre, and clerical 
conservative diehards like Hermann Roeren had left the party. The alliance of 
Centre and Conservatives in  the Reichstag as well  as in  the Prussian Lower 
House, formalized in the Schwarz-Blau-Block  which fought the 19I2  Reichstag 
elections, represented something quite close to the Christian Conservative idea 
of Windthorst. 
Most important of all, the Centre could not be simply a confessional party, 
because of the declining importance by the later nineteenth century of the con- 
fessional appeal itself:  the  -party's  attractiveness to  Catholics qua  Catholics 
was bound to diminish as the heroic days of the Kulturkampf receded into the 
past. This  fact was recognized by its leaders.12  With support for the tariffs of 
I879  and active lobbying for social reforms in  the i88os, the Centre began to 
address itself more to the economic interests of its electorate. The founding of 
9 Hiisgen, Windthorst,  p.  95. 
10  Kreuzzeittng,  3I  Dec.  I906,  cited in G.  D.  Crothers, The  Gerian  Election2s of  1907  (New 
York, 1941),  p.  122.  Bismarck complained in the i88os of the ' constant flirtation '  of the Kreuz- 
zeitung with the Centre. The Holstein Papers, ed. N.  Rich and M. H.  Fisher, 4 vols (Cambridge, 
1955-63),  II,  191- 
11 In  the  Wiirttemberg constituency III  (Heilbronn),  for  example,  Centre and  Conservative 
Agrarians fought  together against Progressives, National  Liberals and  SPD  K.  Jacob,  ' Land- 
tagswahlen und Reichstagswahlen  in Wiirttemberg  ',  Siiddeutsche  Monatshefte  i  (I907),  5I7  f.;  G. 
Kittler, Azss dem  dritten wvirttemnb.  Reichstags-Wahlkreis.  Errinnerungen und  Erlebnlisse  (Heil- 
bronn, 19I0),  pp.  142-3;  Th.Heuss,  Erinnerungen 1905-1933  (Tiibingen, I963),  pp.  59-64. 
12  Thus  Felix  Porsch,  an  important Prussian Centre leader,  warned Kopp  during  the  I893 
crisis over the military bill that the spirit of the Kulturkampf years had declined, and that Centre 
men now weighed matters up very carefully, where once they had followed blindly. H.  Gottwald, 
Zentrum uind  Inmperialismnus,  Diss. (Jena, I966),  p.  129. THE  CENTRE  PARTY  IN  WORTTEMBERG  825 
a plethora of artisan and peasant associations, and of the Volksverein  fur das 
katl2olische  Deutschland shortly  before  Windthorst's  death,  not only  gave  the 
party  an organizational  backbone,  but  were  signs  of its de-clericalization;  and 
this  concentration  on social  policy  was  reinforced  from  the  early  I89os under  a 
new  generation  of leaders.13  Nor did this  involve  a complete  break  with the 
past,  for the problems  of the Catholic  minority  had never  been  exclusively 
religious,  even  in areas  like  the  Rhineland  and  Baden  where  the  attack  on the 
Church  was  particularly  fierce.  Resentment  against  the  Protestant  ascendancy, 
or the ascendancy  of liberal  bureaucrats,  had  an economic  and  social,  as well 
as confessional,  dimension.  German  Catholics  ringed  the Protestant  heartland 
of the  Reich,  their  sense  of separateness  encouraged  by their  relative  economic 
backwardness  as  well  as  by  attacks  on their  clergy.'4  As the  specifically  religious 
component  of this  Celtic  fringe  identity  lost  some  of its immediacy,  more  general 
grievances  came  to the  fore  and  found  expression  through  the  Centre. 
What  requires  explanation  is why this  growing  emphasis  on social  policy, 
accompanied  as  it was  from  the  I89os by declining  aristocratic  influence  within 
the  Centre,  should  have  led the  party  to a pro-Conservative  orientation  rather 
than  to alliance  with  the  Left.  The apparent  paradox  in this  alignment  of the 
Centre  can  be  most  effectively  explained  by  an  examination  of the  party's  nature 
and origins  in one of the states  where  it enjoyed  a strong  local  power-base, 
Wiirttemberg. 
II 
Wiirttemberg  had  a special  reputation  among  German  states  for its advanced 
constitutional  and  political  arrangements.  It was noted  before  the nineteenth 
century  for the checks  which  existed  there  on the exercise  of absolute  state 
power,  for its decentralized  administration  and  for a strong  tradition  of local 
self-government."5  At the end of the eighteenth  century  Charles  James  Fox 
13  By the middle of  the I89os  the founders and Kulturkampi generation within the Centre had 
mostly died:  Mallinckrodt  in  I874,  Savigny in  I875,  Franckenstein  in  I890,  Windthorst in  I89I, 
Peter Reichensperger  in  I892,  Schorlemer and August Reichensperger  in  I895.  A  new  group of 
leaders came to the fore, who were in  their forries  or early fifties at the  time of  Windthorst's 
death:  Julius Bachem, Gr6ber, Fritzen, Hertling, Hitze,  Lieber, Porsch, Spahn, Trimborn. 
14  There was  a considerable contemporary  literature on  the  problem of  ' Catholic backward- 
ness ',  some hostile but much written from the  Catholic side,  giving  detailed information from 
official statistical returns on  the  relative under-representation  of  Catholics in  industry and com- 
merce, in  the free professions, in stare bureaucracies,  in universities and technical colleges. Catho- 
lic  incomes, measured by tax returns, were also considerably lower on  average than  Protestant 
and Jewish incomes. See J. Rost, Die wirtschaftliche  und kulturelle Lage der deutschen Katholiken 
(Cologne,  I9II);  A.  Neher,  Die  wirtschaftliche und  soziale Lage  der Katholiken im  westlichen 
Deutschland (Rottweil,  I927);  J.  Forberger, Die  wirtschaftliche und  kulturelle Riickstdndigkeit 
der Katholiken und ihre Ursachen. Flugschriften des Evangelischen Bundes, Heft  263/4  (Leipzig, 
I908).  See also F.  Naumann, Demokratie und Kaisertum (Berlin,  I900),  p.  I22.  A good example 
of  the struggle between Protestant  towns,  with  their industry, commerce and bureaucracies,  and 
the Catholic countryside, is to be found in  Baden. Cf. F.  Dor,  Jacob Lindau, Badischer Politiker 
und Volksmann  (Freiburg/Breisgau,  I909). 
15 H.  Haering,  ' Wiirttemberg  und  das  Reich  in  der  Geschichte  ',  Zeitschrift  Iiir 826  DAVID  BLACKBOURN 
considered it  the  only  European state outside England  with  a  constitution 
worthy of  the name.16 Large territorial gains during  the Napoleonic  period 
period required a growing administrative centralization, and in many respects 
Wiirttemberg  in the nineteenth century was a formally half-absolute  state, where 
the constitutional centre of gravity lay with  the king  and his  ministers, not 
parliament, and official influence continued to be used at elections up to the 
end  of  the  century.  But  there  remained  constitutional features -  such  as 
parliamentary  control of  the purse-strings -  which  were relatively advanced. 
In  practice, moreover, Karl I (I864-9I)  and Wilhelm  II (I89I-I9I8)  proved 
more enlightened than their royal contemporaries: they left the running  of 
politics to their ministers, even when reforms were being planned, allowing the 
latter to  build  up  close  working  relations with  certain political  leaders in 
parliament." 
Wiirttemberg has a number of  advantages for  a case-study of  the Centre 
party. It was representative  of those south and west German areas which were 
chiefly identified with the change in the nature of the Centre party in the later 
nineteenth century which we have already noted:  a shift away from a residual 
clerical bias, away from aristocratic leadership and towards a greater concern 
with social issues. It was precisely the kind of state where closer co-operation 
between Centre and Left might have been expected. In addition, the Wiirttem- 
berg Centre party possessed in Adolph Gr6ber  18  a powerful local leader who 
was also one of the most prominent members of the leadership group in Berlin, 
and representative  of the new departure of the I89os.  His relationship with the 
Catholic hierarchy in the state mirrored those of Windthorst and Lieber with 
Rome. Moreover, the Catholics in  Wiirttemberg, as in the Reich as a whole, 
constituted a minority of one-third, living in clearly delimited areas in a state 
where religious boundaries  were sharply  drawn.19 
The  most important of  these areas was Oberschwaben, acquired in  stages 
from the Habsburgs, Bavaria and Baden at the beginning  of  the nineteenth 
century, and corresponding to  that part of the administrative division of the 
Donaukreis which  lay south of  the Danube.  The  two other large pockets of 
wiirttembergische  Landesgeschichte, VII,  I943;  K.  Weller,  Wiirttembergische  Geschichte, ed.  A. 
Weller (Stuttgart, I963);  W.  Grube, Der Stuttgarter  Landtag 1457-1957  (Stuttgart, I957). 
16  0.  Burkart, Die  Zusamrnensetzzing  des  Wiirttembergischeiz  Landtags in  der  historischen 
Entwicklung, Diss (Wiirzburg, I922),  p.  3. 
17  K.  Simon, Die  wiirttembergischen  Demokraten (Stuttgart, I969),  pp.  48-9.  The Progressive 
leader Conrad Haussmann referred to Wilhelm II as ' the most democratic king in Germany '. 
18  Adolph Grober, born Riedlingen/Wiirttemberg, iI  February I854,  son of a prosperous gold- 
smith and engraver. Graduated  from Stuttgart Gymnasium i872,  studied law at Tiibingen, Leipzig 
and  Strassburg, entering state judiciary I877.  He  had  reached position of  state  prosecutor in 
Ravensburg  when political activity interrupted  his legal career. Entered Reichstag for XV Wiirttem- 
berg constituency I887,  and  Lower  House  of  Landtag  I889,  representing his  home  town.  In 
Wiirttemberg  he was unchalleged leader of  local Centre party until death in  I9I9.  In  Berlin he 
quickly became a confidant of Windthorst, and from the  I89os  was  regarded as one of  the most 
important  southern  German  leaders of the national Centre.  19 See map, pp.  828-9. THE  CENTRE  PARTY  IN  WURTTEMBERG  827 
Catholics were  less  significant in  numbers:  the  Schuwarztvaldkreis  around 
Rottweil, Rottenburg and Spaichingen; and the area of the Jagstkreis near the 
towns iof  Ellwangen, Aalen, Gmiind and Neresheim. What they had in common 
was a peripheral  position in the Protestant state, once again a microcosm of that 
in which German Catholics as a whole found themselves. This was an important 
conditioning  factor, for  the  outlying,  inaccessible Catholic strongholds were 
divorced not only from the peculiarly militant, pietistic brand of Protestantism 
espoused in Alt-Wiirttemberg:  local trade links with Bavaria and Switzerland 
marked  the  separation of  Catholics in  Oberschwaben especially from  the 
economic as well as the religious life of the state, which was centred on Stuttgart 
and the Protestant Neckar valley. Just as St Gallen and Lucerne provided a 
haven from religious intolerance, so a trade in  agricultural produce through 
the  port of  Friedrichshafen linked  the  Catholic peasantry of  Tettnang  and 
Waldsee more closely with their Swiss market on the far shore of Lake Constance 
than with  their fellow-citizens north of the Danube.20 
The  social separateness  of these Catholic communities was crucial in deter- 
mining  their eventual political development in  Wiirttemberg, for the timing 
oif the Centre's appearance in the state suggests that neither traditional gross- 
deutsclh sentiment,  nor  the  level  of  antiJCatholic feeling,  is  adequate as an 
explanation of the party's  emergence. 
The  Centre was not formed at state level in Wiirttemberg until  I894,  and 
it is the lateness of its emergence which makes it difficult to explain the party's 
origins in  terms of  the anti-Prussian feeling  which was evident in  areas like 
the  Rhineland.  Catholic Wiirttemberg was  overwhelmingly  grossdeutsch in 
i848,  but so was Protestant feeling. This  was perhaps the strongest common 
bond in  the state:  all  103  petitions received at Frankfurt from Wiirttemberg 
called for an Austrian emperor for Germany, and the anti-governmental, anti- 
Prussian liberals who  made up  the bulk  of  the  state's representation at  the 
Paulskirche reflected the views of both confessions.21  Nor did the events of the 
i86os and  I870s,  -although they led to the creation of a strong local National 
Liberal party, deprive Catholics of a vehicle for expressing grossdeutsch feeling. 
The anti-Prussian  strain of liberalism survived more powerfully in Wiirttemberg 
than elsewhere, producing in the Volkspartei a specifically Swabian form of a 
Progressive party. Catholics therefore 'had  no need to create a party which was 
anti-Prussiaan  and particularist; and the potential leaders of such a party were 
content to remain within the liberal  fold. The most prominent Catholic politician 
of  the  years between  I850  and  I890  was  Rudolph  Probst,2' a  leader of  the 
20  C.  Bauer, Politischer-  Katholizismus in  Wiirtternberg  bis zum  Jahr I848  (Freiburg/Breisgau, 
1929),  p.  I9. 
21  On the unanimity of views  among both confessions, see the letters written by Moritz Mohl 
to  his brother Julius, 30 May,  I848  to  2I  April,  I849,  in  K.  Demeter,  Grossdeutsche  Stimmen 
(Frankfurt/M.  I939),  pp.  54-60;  and T.  Schnurre, Die  wfirtteinbergischen  Abgeordneten in  der 
konstituirenden  deutschen  Nationalver-sammlung  zu  Frankfurt  amii Main  (Stuttgart,  I912). 
22  On  Probst's political views  and  activities, see A.  Hagen,  Gestalten atus demn SchwZbischen 828  DAVID  BLACKBOURN 
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Volkspartei who  sat in  Berlin with  the  Centre group, but  was  adamant in 
refusing to countenance  what he considered the unnecessary  creation of a Centre 
party  in the state. 
At  the time  of  the  Centre's foundation  locally,  the  Volkspartei had  not 
modified its -anti-Prussian  feelings:  indeed, it fought the i895  Lcaidtag elections 
on  an  anti-governmental platform  strikingly  reminiscent  of  Karl  Mayer's 
earlier anti-Prussian  Volkspartei  campaigns, with Prime Minister von Mittnacht 
cast as Bismarckian  villain. If any party relinquished its old particularist  notions 
in the I89os,  it  was, as we have seen, the Centre, whose  leaders in  Berlin - 
among them Gr6ber  -  now began to change course and make the Centre a party 
of government. If Catholics in Wiirttemberg had wished in  the i89os  to cast 
a vote against the power of Prussia and its institutions, the protest would have 
been registered most effectively by voting  for  the particularist and still anti- 
militarist Volkspartei. In fact, a generation after Koniggratz, the ' diplomatic 
phase'  of Prussia's relations with  the southern states had altered:  the Reich 
had become a more integrated state, and anti-Prussian  feeling no longer played 
such a major role in  Wii'rttemberg  politics. If it had, the Centre would  have 
been more embarrassed  on this issue than its local Progressive opponents. 
Neither  can  the  timing  of  the  Centre's emergence be  readily understood 
within the chronology oif anti-Catholic feeling in the state. From the first half 
of the century the Church had been kept in a position of humiliating dependence 
through ithe state's Catholic Church Council, which  decided even  the length 
of sermons and the hours when confessions might be heard.2"  In Rottenburg, 
chosen as head of  the Wiirttemberg see because of its  proximity to the state 
administrative  centre of Stuttgart, the bishop was obliged to share his residence 
with a seminary in the buildings of an old Carmelite convent.24  Slights of this 
kind, along with the outlawing of teaching orders and discrimination against 
Catholics in official appointments, remained as standing reproaches  to Catholic 
arnour-propre  throughout the century. But the high-point of anti-Catholic feel- 
ing  was in fact reached in  the  i850s.  No  struggle in  the later period was as 
fierce as that waged by the Lower House of the Landtag against the Concordat 
Of 1857,  as anti-clerical and  anti-Catholic elements  combined successfully to 
prevent its ratification.25  No Caitholic  or Centre party emerged from this defeat, 
nor in  the following  decades. The  absence of a full-blooded Ktulturkam?pf  in 
Wiirttemberg had the effect that no  Centre -party  came into  existence, as in 
Katholizismus, 4 vols.  (Stuttgart, I948-54),  I,  296  if.;  Burkart, Die  Zusamcmensetzving  des  Wiirt- 
tembergischen  Landtags, p.  I04  ff.;  A.  Scheuerle, Der  politische Katholizismntus  in  Wiirtternberg 
wahrend  der Jah7e  I857-I87I,  Diss. (Tiubingen,  I923). 
23  Between I802  and  I842  alone the Church Council published 377 ordinances, almost twice as 
many as the episcopal authorities. Bauer, Politischer Katholizismus, p.  I4. 
24  Bauer,  Politischer  Katholizisinus  in  Wii7ttemberg, p.  i9;  K.  Bachem,  Vorgeschichte, 
Geschichte  und Politik der deutschen Zentrumspartei,  9 vols.  (Cologne,  I927-32),  I,  233-4. 
25  Bachem, Vorgeschichte, Geschichte und Politik,  IV,  35I;  A.  Hagen,  Staat und Katholische 
Kir-che in  Wiirtten2berg  in  den  Jahren  I848-I862  (Stuttgart,  I928). THE  CENTRE  PARTY  IN  WURTTEMBERG  83I 
other parts of the Reich, with the initial and primary function of defending the 
Church against persecution. Catholic members of the Lower House continued 
to sit with  the various Protestant-dominated  parliamentary  groups, most join- 
ing  Probst in  the umbrella grouping of the Linken, based on the core of the 
Volkspartei, the  remainder sitting  with  the  pro-governmental Landespartez. 
While  Catholics in  the laiter i88os and early I89os  were concerned abouL  the 
intemperate attacks of the Evangelical League, the level of official discrimina- 
tion  remained constant, or even  diminished.  Prominent  Catholics remained 
accordingly lukewarm on the subject of forming a Centre party at the  local 
level.26 
Nor  did the Catholic electorate seem anxious to withdraw its support from 
Progressive politicians where it had the opportunity. The  Volkspartei was the 
traditional party of lower middle-class radicalism in Oberschwaben, and at an 
election in I862 in Waldsee, only a short time after the 1857  controversy,  it was 
still able to win with a Protestant candidate against a Catholic conservative.27 
Even the outburst of Catholic fury which was unleashed by the events of I866-7 
left no permanent demand for confessional representation.28  Two elections held 
in Gmiind showed that a Progressive standing on a radical, anti-governmental 
platform could still beat a specifically Catholic candidate. In i868 the conserva- 
tive Catholic Karle temporarily won  the seat by obtaining the rural Catholic 
vote; but the Progressive Streich was able to win it back in a by-election the 
following  year.29 Throughout  the  I870s  an.d beyond, Catholic Wiirttemberg 
continued to vote for  Volkspartei men  of  a radical democratic hue,  without 
regard to confession. 
III 
It was not until the very beginning of the i89os  that Adolph Gr6ber, who hlad 
been agitating since the i88os for the foundation of a Centre party, began to 
receive a livelier response; and within five years the party was constituted and 
prepared  to fight a successful election campaign in I895. The sudden emergence 
of the Centre at local level has been largely passed over by historians dealing 
with  Wiirttemberg politics. Their  attention has focused instead on the series 
of  reforming parliaments which,  from  the  I89os,  swept away the remaining 
unelected members of the Wiirttemberg Lower House,  revised the systems of 
local government and education and introduced a progressive income tax. And 
in  -dealing with  the  wate,rshed which  the  I89os  undoubtedly represented in 
Wiirttemberg politics, the role of  the  Volkspartei, and to a lesser extent the 
SPD,  have been most carefully examined.30  When  the Centre party has been 
26  Bachem,  Vorgeschichte, Geschichte und Politik,  viii,  6o  f.;  H.  Cardauns, Adolph  Grbber 
(M.-Gladbach, I92I),  pp.  63-7. 
27  Scheuerle, Der politische Katholizismnus  in Wiirtternberg,  p.  I35. 
28  In  Laupheim, Oberschwaben, Catholics sacked a  Protestant Church, G.  C.  Windell,  The 
Catholics  and German  Unity, I866-7I  (Minneapolis,  I954),  p.  6. 
29  Scheuerle, Der politische Katholizismus  in Wiirttemberg,  p. 2I3. 
30  G.  Egelhaaf,  ' Wiirttemberg in  den fiinfundzwanzig  Jahren I89I-I9I6  ',  Wiirtten2bergische 832  DAVID  BLACKBOURN 
considered  at all, both its appearance  on the local political  stage and its sub- 
sequent  anti-Left  alignment  have  been  ascribed  simply  to confessional  factors.3" 
This, however,  does not answer  the question  of why the Centre emerged  in 
Wiirttemberg  when it did; nor does it explain  why Catholic  voters  who had 
previously  been happy  to entrust  their  representation  to the Progressive  Volks- 
partei  should  now switch to a party  which on political  issues was less in the 
van of progress.  It will be argued  here that the predominance  in Wiirttemberg 
of medium-sized  landholdings  and small  business  concerns,  usually  emphasized 
as a stimulus  to progressive  politics,  also created  a strong  current  of social  con- 
servatism.  Under the impact  of rapid  industrialization  it was not the radical 
politics  of the Volkspartei  and their  SPD allies  on the Left, but the conservative 
social  policies  of the Centre  and their  Agrarian  Conservative  allies  on the Right 
which ultimately  gained the support  of those 'middling' social  groups  which 
were beginning  to face the future  with apprehension.  It was against  this back- 
ground that the 'natural constituency  ' of the Centre party was turned, in 
Wiirttemberg,  into  an actual  political  power-base. 
The isolation  and sense  of separateness  of the Catholic  communities  was less 
obvious  in the first  half of the century,  when communications  were uniformly 
bad, and the Protestant  parts  of the state as undeveloped  economically  as the 
Catholic  regions.  But when industrialization  did come  it was uneven: if until 
I850  Wiirttemberg  stood still while the rest of Germany  advanced,  after that 
date  the Catholic  regions  of Wiirttemberg  stood  still  while  other  parts  of the  state 
advanced.  The I85os brought  the first  wave of industrialization.  The census  of 
occupations  in i86i showed that while from I835  to I852  the population  had 
increased  by i6o,ooo, and those employed  in industry  by only 30,000,  in the 
decade  after  I852 the  population  fell by 13,000,  but those  engaged  in industry 
rose  by 40,000.32  By I863 the government  official  Mahrlen  was already  claiming 
that Wiirttemberg  had made the transition  from Agrarstaat to one in which 
large-scale  manufacturing  was prominent.33  The proportion  of those  dependent 
on agriculture  for a living fell steadily,  until by I882 it was less than half (48.5 
per  cent)  of the population,  and  by I907  stood  at only  38.5  per  cent. 
There was not only a tilting of the scales  between  agriculture  and industry, 
Vierteliahrshefte  fuir  Landesgeschichte,  xxv  (I9I6);  E.  Marquand, Geschichte Wiirtiembergs  (Stutt- 
gart,  I96I),  p.  348; Grube, Der Stuttgarter  Landtag, p. 549; R.  Menzinger, Verfassungsrevision 
und  Demokratisierungsprozess  im  Konigreich  Wiirttemberg (Stuttgart,  I969);  K.  Simon,  Die 
wiirttembergischen  Demokraten, especially p.  58  ff.;  H.  Schlemmer, Die  Rolle der Sozialdemok- 
ratie in  den  Landtagen Badens und  Wiirttembergs  und  ihr  Einfluss auf  die  Entwictlung  der 
Gesamtpartei  zwischen I890  und  1914,  Diss. (Freiburg/Breisgau, 1953),  pp.  45.57. 
31  The accounts of the Centre party given in the sources noted above (fn.  30)  are representative 
in making this judgement. 
32  Report on census returns  by Gustav Schmoller, in Wfirttembergische  lahrbiicher  (Wlbb) (I862), 
p.  283  ff. 
33  WJbb  (I863),  p.  40  ff.; Das Konigreich Wiirttemberg.  Eine Beschreibung  von Land Volk und 
Staat. Herausgegeben von  dem K6niglichen Statistisch-topographischen  Bureau (Stuttgart, I863), 
p.  55I.  (Henceforth: Das Konigreich, edition cited.) THE  CENTRE  PARTY  IN  WtRTTEMBERG  833 
but a basic change in the nature and scale of industry itself. Before I85o  even 
the large-scale  industry which had existed was forced to compromise with the 
tradition of  decentralized village  crafts, by  giving  out  work  to  occupy the 
winter evenings of the peasantry: at the beginning of the I830s  the Heidenheim 
textile firm  of  Mebold had  25  workers in  its  factory and  II5  outside;  the 
Zoeppritz brothers in  Mergelstetten had  II2  workers in  their factory and a 
further I05  outside.34  After the middle of the century this pattern of part-time 
outwork  declined, and  the  number of  machines in  the  factories increased 
enormously. The  absence of  an indigenous machine-producing industry had 
been a serious handicap in  the first half of the century, resulting in factories 
having equipment often 20-30  years out of date. The development of this sector 
after I850  was the basis of the state's growing world-wide reputation for quality 
finished goods:  by I882  there were I74  concerns in this branch, which grew by 
a further 43 per cent before I895.  Over the same period the number of firms 
employing over 50  men increased more than threefold.35 
Against  this  background  of  industrialization  and  the  prosperity which 
accompanied it, the Catholic areas remained solid in the pursuit of their tradi- 
tional occupations. The separate development of Catholic Wiirttemberg in the 
later part of the nineteenth century was rooted in economic backwardness; and 
this was in turn based on different traditions of property inheritance and their 
effect on the size of peasant holdings. 
Wiirttemberg was not dominated by 'dwarf  holdings'  like its neighbours 
Baden and Hesse. Just over 40 per cent of all holdings were small or medium in 
size, between io and 50 Morgen (6-35  acres); of the remainder, those over 35 
acres outnumbered the dwarf holdings of under 6 acres by three to two. With 
the exception of Protestant Hohenlohe and the Protestant parts of the Alb, the 
size of holdings corresponded  to the confessional division, larger on the Catholic 
side and smaller on the Protestant.  In Catholic areas,  above all in Oberschwaben, 
tradition was for the patrimony to be handed on undivided to a single heir. The 
typical agricultural unit  in  Catholic Wiirttemberg was  the  family  farm  of 
medium or large size, similar to those which formed the backbone of Bavarian 
husbandry; many had been supplemented by gains made during the break-up 
of communal land at the end of the eighteenth century. This provided a clear 
contrast with  the Protestant Neckar valley, where a combination of  climate, 
fertile land and the absence of primogeniture led to increasingly parcelled small 
plots. Whereas in the Neckarland only  I3.8  per cent of holdings were greater 
than 35 acres, in the Oberland the figure was 56.3 per cent, or 20  per cent above 
the state average. Conversely, half of  all holdings in the Neckar valley were 
smaller than 6 acres, less than an eighth in Oberschwaben.36 
34  P.  Gehring, ' Von List bis Steinbeis  ', Zeitschrift fur warttembergische  Landesgeschichte,  vii 
(I943), 435. 
35  L. Dessauer, Die Industrialisierung  von Gross-Stuttgart,  Diss.  (Tiubingen,  I9I6),  p.  I98. 
36  Das Konigreich (I863),  p.  429. In the Allgau, the consolidation of  common land into farms 
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These differences were decisive in the years of agricultural crisis during the 
I840s,  for the heaviest burden of debt and the highest incidence of bankruptcy 
fell on those areas where dwarf holdings predominated. The Donaukreis con- 
tributed only  I5  per cent of  the total of  forced sales affecting landholders,37 
and one particularly  hard-hit group, the vintners, were hardly represented in 
the south-east  Catholic region of the state, where wine was produced only in a 
small area around Tettnang.38 Here the worst affected group was that of  the 
traditional landless village lower class, the Soldner and K6Ibler: in  the  1840s 
and I85os the Catholic farm owners had the fear of sharing their fate, but not 
yet the experience of it. By contrast, the choice facing the densely settled Pro- 
testant peasantry was stark:  to subdivide further (frequently a physical impos- 
sibility), or to leave the land for the town or overseas. The rural artisans faced 
a similar dilemma, ruined both by peasant poverty and competition from the 
factory. The flight from the land and the traditional crafts was thus largely a 
Protestant phenomenon, and the effect of the agricultural crisis of mid-century 
was to create  two distinct economic units within Wiirttemberg: one industrializ- 
ing fast and mainly Protestant, the other agricultural and largely Catholic. 
The  three nmain  foci of industrialization were all Protestant. First was the 
Greater Stuttgart conurbation, formed as the city gradually drew the surround- 
ing communities of ;Cannstatt,  Feuerbach, Untertiirkheim, Wangen,  Gaisburg 
and Degerloch within its industrial and commercial orbit. Stuttgart's popula- 
tion increased  from 48,000 in i834  to 63,000 in I852,  doubled in the next twenty 
years and reached 172,000  by the turn of the century.3"  Cannstatt grew fron 
7,ooo in  mid-century to  20,000  in  I890;  from  the exclusive spa town which 
Balzac had known it became a solidly working-class suburb of Stuttgart and a 
major railway junction and repair centre.40  The second area was made up by a 
group of  towns in  the Neckar valley, Reutlingen,  Esslingen and Heilbronn, 
which  were closely linked  to Stuttgart, and  like  the capital city had grown 
enormously by soaking up labour from the land. The  third group consisted of 
four  towns,  three  in  the  extreme  north  of  the  Donaukreis  (Geislingen, 
G5ppingen, Ulm), and one in the Jagstkreis  (Heidenheim); but both geographi- 
cally and  economically, these towns  looked  west -towards Stuttgart and  the 
Neckar, rather than south or east to the isolated Catholic valleys. 
Catholics took almost no part in this movement into the towns and factories. 
In the i86os, after the first great wave of internal migration, still none of the 
six towns over  io,ooo  was  Catholic; only one  of  the ten between 5,ooo and 
IO,ooo;  and only three of the twenty-four between 3,ooo and s,ooo. Catholics 
had been taking place from as early as the end of tlhe sixteenth century. Cf. H.  Hooffrnann,  Lald- 
wuirtscliajt  und Industrie in  Wii-ttember-g  (Berlin, I935),  pp.  I39-40. 
37  Wlbb (I847), p. I79  f- 
38  K.  C.  Hainlen,  Geineinfassliche neatirliche Beschreibtong Wiirttensbergs.  Mit  besonderer 
Beziehung au] die Landuvirtschajt  (Stuttgart, I867),  p.  94. 
39  Dessauer,  Die Industrialisierung  von Gross-Stuttgart,  p.  I9I. 
40  W.  Blos, Denktvfirdigkeiten  eiu  es Sozialdeinokraten, 2  vols.  (Munich, I9I4-I9),  II,  74. THE  CENTRE  PARTY  IN  WORTTEMBERG  835 
made up scarcely  one-tenth of the total urban population, but four-fifths of those 
living in scattered  farms and hamlets.4"  This remained true for the next thirty 
years. The  official description of  Ellwangen  published in  i886 remarked on 
the ' predominantly agricultural' character of the district; 6o per cent of the 
inhabitants gained a livelihood directly from the land.42 In Biberach in  I895, 
55 per cent of  the population continued to be dependent on agriculture as a 
source of incolme,  only 33 per cent on industry and commerce.43  By the end of 
the century the average number of those living from agriculture in the state's 
seventeen Reichstag constituencies was 44.5 per cent; in the four constituencies 
with a Catholic majority it was 56 per cent.44 
It was therefore a Catholic peasantry still intact in its old communities and 
occupations  which faced the economic problems of the later nineteenth century; 
and with it a flourishing Mittelstand in derivative occupations like small-scale 
brewing and milling,  and other crafts like metal-working and leather goods 
manufacture which  lived off peasant custom. And  the two decades after the 
mid-century climacteric proved to be good ones for agriculture and the small 
businesses and shops which  it  supported; a golden  interim between the old 
crises of dearth and the beginning  of  a long-term crisis of  a different kind, 
brought on by collision with  the world market and its falling  prices. In all 
agricultural regions land was brought under the plough, the prices of produce 
and property  rose and Riimelin writing in the early i86os could claim that agri- 
culture was largely free of debt.4 Wiirttemberg continued to export grain until 
i874,46 and the wars of i866 and I870-7I  disguised the advent of a downward 
turn in  prices. Nowhere  was  this  temporary prosperity and  optimism more 
apparent  than in Oberschwaben,  where it was reported  that among the peasantry 
even the possession of state bonds had become normal.47 
This  situation was  rudely sha'ttered  by  declining  agricultural returns, as 
price levels in Wiirttemnberg  became increasingly affected by world prices which 
were themselves falling, as new lands in North America, eastern Europe and 
India were brought into cultivation. Lower freight rates brought cheap agri- 
cultural produce to German ports, and after I87I  a railway network of national 
dimensions opened up the state to these supplies. At the same time, an increased 
volume of river traffic carried grain down the Rhine to Mannheim, and then 
on  to  Heilbronn  and Stuttgart, where it  was  distributed by  dealers on  the 
41  Das Konigreich  (I863),  p.  349. 
42  Beschreibung des  Oberamts Ellwangen,  Herausgegeben von  dem  K6niglichen  Statistisch- 
topographischen  Bureau  (Stuttgart, i886), pp.  202,  267. 
43  Das K6nigreich  (I907),  IV,  I4. 
44  WJbb,  I  (I898),  206-7.  Max Miller, in his Eugen Bolz,  Staatsmann und Bekenner (Stuttgart, 
195i),  has a  good  description of  Rottenburg in  the  last  decades of  the  nineteenth century; a 
'stilles  Landstadtchen  '  while  industrialization was beginning in  the surrounding areas. 
45  Cited by G.  Dehlinger, ' Ein Uberblick iuber  die Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft  in  Wiirt- 
temberg  seit  der  Mitte  des i8 Jahrhunderts  ',  WJbb,  I (I897),  7I. 
46  M.  Biihler, Die  Stellung  Wiirttembergs  zum  Umschwung in  der Bismarck'schen Handels- 
politik i878/9,  Diss. (Tiubingen,  I935),  p. 48.  47  Das Konigreich  (I863),  pp- 437-8- 836  DAVID  BLACKBOURN 
Produktenb&rse  at a standard price. Harvest failures in  i873,  I876,  i888 and 
I889 brought no repetition of the price rises in i854,  while the dominant trend 
of world prices was a downward movement to which all three main grains of 
Oberschwaben  -  spelt, oats and barley -  were subject. Spelt, the main winter 
crop, reached 2o.68M  per dz. (ioo  kg.) in  1854,  a price attained again for the 
last time in  I872;  after i882  the price only twice exceeded i5M.  Barley, too, 
reached  a peak  in i854  at 20.9iM, but after  the 1870s never  rose  above  the 14- 
15M figure. The same was true of oats, where the i88os signalled the decisive 
downward turn."8 
The loss of income sustained by primary producers was compounded by the 
sharp rise in costs which began to affect them a,t the same time:  in particular 
the rising cost of farm labour resulting from the competition of railway con- 
struction and factories, with  their obvious attractions of  higher wages, more 
regular and normally shorter hours and greater independence. Between  i882 
and  I895  the number of male and female servants resident on farms fell  by 
1,716,  the number of day labourers by over 5,500.  While  the total number of 
wage earners in  the state increased by more than 50 per cent, the number on 
the  land  actually fell  by  nearly 5  per cent,49 and shortage and competition 
combined to raise the wages of male agricultural servants by over 300 per cent 
between  i86o and  I889,  and those of female servants by over 200  per cent.0 
This problem was critical  in Catholic communities, where considerable  numbers 
of servants and day labourers  had always been essential to supplement the labour 
of family members on medium and large farms. It seems possible that the rising 
birth rate which  now  became evident in  these areas was  at  least in  part a 
response to the chronic shortage of non-family labour.i 
Increased taxes to  finance illness,  accident, old-age and invalid  insurance 
created an additional burden:  in the three decades up to the 18gos the total of 
taxes and contributions rose fourfold, and to this must be added contributions 
to  hail  and  fire  insurance.52  Falling  land prices were an index  of  growing 
pessimis,m  and agricultural distress; and they represented  too a drop in the real 
value of property. This drop in prices was most extreme in Oberschwaben, just 
48  WJbb,  II  (I896),  I22. 
49  WJbb, I  (I897),  I76-7;  Die  Landwir-tschaft  und die Landwirtschajtspflege  in  Wiirttenzberg. 
Denkschrilt Hrsg, von der K. Zentralstelle fair  die Landwirtschcaft  (Stuttgart, I908),  p.  I9I. 
50  ?VJbb,  I  (I897),  179. 
51 A  declining rate of  infant mortality also,  of  course, played a  part, for it  had earlier been 
highest in  the  Catlholic areas. A  Heimatsromnan  set  in  Oberschwaben, Meine  Steinauer  (Stutt- 
gart/Leipzig,  I908),  and  written by  Wilhelm  Schussen, a  school friend of  Matthias Erzberger, 
confirms the widespread use of family labour on the farm, and discouragement  of  those children 
who preferred  to leave the land to seek employment. 
52  WJbb, I  (I897),  74 Insurance premiums were especially severe in  agricultural insurance, be- 
cause the returns,  to  the  companies were smaller and  much less  reliable. In  life  insurance, for 
example, only  50  per cent of  income  was  returned in  claims,  in  agricultural insurance 8o per 
cent. At  a time when  land  was losing  its profitability, the companies were naturally concerned 
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as that part of the state had been best placed to profit from the confidence of 
the better  years.53 
Catholic peasants who  had escaped the indebtedness of  earlier crises now 
found themselves thrown on the capital market at a time when  credit terms 
were unprecedentedly bad. In the first half of the century capital had flowed 
mainly  into  the  land,  but  successive crises had  destroyed the  confidence of 
creditors  in the peasantry.  Interest rates rose " and capital turned to safer invest- 
ments in state railways, or to industry and commerce where returns were higher. 
It was complained that money was no longer loaned against a simple promissory 
note (Schuldschein) but only on mortgage (Pfandschein); by I897  three-quarters 
of the debt owed by agriculture was in the form of mortgages. In the Donau- 
kreis the total value of mortgage debts taken on increased  by 42  per cent between 
I874  and I894:  harsh credit terms were being tied to the security of property 
which was losing both its profitability  and its market value.55 
The first of two government inquiries into the state of agriculture  found that 
the average number of bankruptcies in the four Kreise per io,ooo owners was 
37.25.  Strikingly, the western, Protestant areas which had been worst affected 
earlier in the century now escaped more lightly:  the figure for the Neckarkreis 
was 3I  per io,ooo, and for the Schwarzwaldkreis  23.  The less densely populated 
part of Wiirttemberg, with its larger holdings, was now the centre of the crisis: 
the figures for the Jagstkreis and Donaukreis were 52  and 42  per io,ooo.  The 
Catholic areas  were the worst-suffering,  and now paid the price for earlier  success 
in resisting debt, foreclosure  and flight from the land. This was especially so in 
the Catholic heartland of Oberschwaben,  where Wangen, with 7I  bankruptcies 
per IO,ooo, was one of the most badly affected communities, and Saulgau (58), 
Ehingen and Leutkirch (47) and Rieidlingen and Tettnang (46) were all well 
above the state average.56 
Distress was strongly felt among the Catholic peasantry, for agriculture was 
at the very centre of life. Rottenburg's newspaper, for example, called itself the 
Hopfenzeitung,  after the crop on which the livelihood of most of its readers 
depended. This  same paper was  once obliged to  remind its  readers that ' a 
newspaper is,  so to speak, more than just the Borsenblatt of  the peasant  '.5 
53 Over the  three periods I880-84,  I885-9  and  i89o-94,  the  fall  in  land values was  actually 
levelling off in the state as a whole; in the Donaukreis the loss of saleable value was still increas- 
ing,  from 9-7  per cent in  I880-84  to  I2-3  per cent in  I890-94.  WJbb, II  (I895),  2I. 
54  In  the  I82os  interest rates were usually 4 per cent, after mid-century 5 2  per cent.  Wlbb, I 
(I897),  70.  In  the  second half  of  the  century agricultural co-operative banks,  after Raiffeisen's 
model,  were established, but they too  had to  reckon with  the  vicissitudes to  which  agriculture 
was peculiarly prone, and the consequent unreliability of the peasant as a debtor. Stockmayer, an 
Agrarian deputy in the Wiirttemberg  Lower House, spoke of one such association  with an  interest 
rate of  6  per cent  ' to  encourage prompt repayment  '.  Verhandlungen der  Wiirttembergischen 
Kammer der Abgeordneten aul  dem 33  Landtag. Protokoll Band  I,  I20,  I0  Sitzung,  8.3.1895 
(henceforth:  33 LT, PB i,  126  10  Sitz., 8.3.  895). 
55  WJbb,  II (I895),  9,  I4. 
56  WJbb,  I (I893),  I33  ff  57  Rottenburger  Zeitung und Neckarbote, i6 Sept. I9II. 838  DAVID  BLACKBOURN 
Adolph  Gr6ber, beginning his legal career in Catholic Neresheim, noted with 
some impatience -that the local peasantry was 'interested in  nothing but agri- 
culture '.58  In the late i88os this interest quickened, as a series of factors outside 
their control -  changing world trade, the development of railways and canals, 
the po'wer  of Produktenb&rse  to fix prices at the expense of the local Schirannen, 
the labour shortage, the vagaries of  the capital market -  made primary pro- 
ducers aware of their impotence. At  the same time, there was a slackening of 
that  solicitude  which  governments  had  always  shown  towards agriculture. 
Before the i86os, most ministers and officials had echoed the warnings of the 
writer in the Wiirttembergische  lalrbiicher  of I839 on the social dangers to be 
expected from industrialization 59; and backed their beliefs with a steady flow 
of aid and credit to the countryside. But by the last two decades of the century, 
industry and commerce provided the sta'te  with most of its revenue, and govern- 
ment and officials were more concerned with ameliorating the problems caused 
by industrialization than with  preaching the social worth of  the Agrarstaat. 
The  changing official mind  was  indicated by  the development of  insurance 
schemes with their chief benefit to the factory worker, and by a new concern 
with industrial training programmes.  An equally telling sign was the emergence 
of a new kind of official, like the pioneering Wiirttemberg statistician Losch,6" 
whose interests lay in urban housing conditions and suburban railway services. 
When the government did investigate agricultural distress, rural disenchant- 
ment was plain. It was reported from Ravensburg and Waldsee that the state 
fiscal burdens were felt as ' oppressive  ', while  the district of  Thaldorf  com- 
mented that its results ' are not of the kind which would win the rural popula- 
tion for social legislation'.61  Resentment against the olympian detachment of a 
distant government played an important role in the elections of the period. But 
it  was  not  the  traditionally anti-governmental Volkspartei which  henceforth 
reaped the reward; and it failed because, unlike its political cousins in France, 
the Radicals, it lost the support of the peasantry and lower middle class in the 
small towns and villages. French liberalism consolidated its hold among these 
groups by pressing parish-pump  demands in Paris: never losing a basic belief in 
the peasant state as a guarantee of social stability, it abhorred rapid industrial 
growth, and encouraged the safe investment of capital in government bonds 
rather than in  speculative industrial ventures. The  agrarian order was under- 
58  H. Cardauns,  Adolph Gr8ober  (M-Gladbach,  I92I),  p.  26. 
59  ' Hopelessness and dependence on  the factory owner,  the destruction of  family life  and the 
spreading of immorality '  would attend industrialization. WJbb (I839),  p.  7I  f.  Cf.  the remarks 
of  Minister von Weckherlin, retorting to  Friedrich List's demand  for government-sponsored  in- 
dustry, that ' factories are the greatest danger, for they bring men up to become either beggars or 
agitators  '.  Marquand, Geschichte Wiirtteinbergs,  P. 335; Gehring, Voni  List bis Steinbeis, p.  4I4. 
60  Losch's overriding interest in the social problems of  industrial society put him on close per- 
sonal and political terms with Friedrich Naumann's  ' Social Liberal '  group, for  whom  hie con- 
tested a  Wiirttemberg Reichstag election against a  Bauer-nbund  Agrarian. See M.  Miller and R. 
Uhland (eds.), Lebensbilder  aus Schtvabeni  und Franken, ix  (Stuttgart, I963),  403,  406-7. 
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written in  a practical sense by protective tariffs. Germany's Progressives, by 
contrast, were Manchester men, and nowhere more clearly than in Wiirttem- 
berg:  free movement of labour and free trade were central articles of faith, and 
'cheap bread ' a fundamental part of their policy. 
The Progressives  sought to counter the unpopularity  of this stance by persuad- 
ing the peasantry  that tariffs  were a Junker device; but without success, although 
many of their arguments were undoubtedly correct. They  were right to point 
out, for example, that large estates were the main beneficiaries of high grain 
tariffs. It was also misleading to claim, as agrarian  spokesmen did, that the influx 
of  foreign  agricultural produce into  Germany would  shortly cease, and that 
tariffs were simply a temporary necessity:  Russia was committed to exporting 
grain  at  whatever cost,  while  the  amount  of  virgin  land  still  available in 
Argentina,  Canada and Australia made it  likely  that all  would  continue to 
increase their exports to Germany.62  In Wiirttemberg it was chimerical to expect 
a long-term solution to the crisis of foreign competition, for there was no escap- 
ing  the main problem:  after the  i88os the state could no longer provide its 
growing urban population with food, and the bakers anyway preferred foreign 
grain, once it became available, because of its superior quality.63  The duties on 
rye and wheat were also of little use in areas  like Oberschwaben,  where they were 
rarely grown.64 In fact the duties harmed large and medium-sized farms in 
three distinct ways. First, Prussian grain growers, having priced themselves out 
of world markets, dumped in southern Germany and so further deflated prices. 
Secondly, the repercussions  of the protectionist barrier harmed the flourishing 
export of oats to Switzerland. Finally, the one-sided protection of grain worked 
against the cattle-raiser's  interests: it limited his domestic market by keeping the 
proportion of family budgets spent on bread very high; and it made feedstuffs 
more expensive.` 
This  was the case put by  Volkspartei  politicians, and by liberal economists 
like Albert Bartens. More recent writers on Wiirttemberg have also argued that 
62  R.  Drill,  Soll  Deutschland seimen gan2zen Getreidebedarf selbst  produzieren? (Stuttgart, 
i895),  pp.  23, 36 if.; H.  Rosenberg, ' Zur sozialen Funktion der Agrarpolitik im Zweiten Reich 
Probleme  der deutschen  Sozialgesch2ichte (Frankfurt/M.,  I969),  p.  6o. 
63  A.  Bartens, Die, wirtschaftliche Enttvicklung des  Konigreichs TViirtternberg  mit  beson7derer 
Beriicksichtigiing der Handelsvertrage  (Frankfurt/M.,  190I),  p.  35 if.  Milling technology in  Ger- 
many was  initially incapable of  dealing with  the  hard wheat from the  great plains of  Central 
Europe and North America, but by the i88os new  techniques developed in the U.S.A.  by millers 
using prairie wheat had been introduced into Germany, and from that time the remaining advan- 
tage of domestic grain was destroyed. Cf. K. W.  Hardach, Die Bedeutuzg tvirtschaftlicher  Faktoren 
bei dcer  Wiedereinfiihr-ug  der Eisen- unld Getreidez6lle  in Deutschland I879  (Berlin, I969),  p.  76. 
64  Hainlen,  Gerneinfassliche  natiirliche Beschreibung Wiirttem)lbergs,  pp.  86-7. 
65  On this subject, see especially A. Gerschenkron,  Bread and Democracy in Germnany  (Berkeley, 
1943), who argues at length the Junker deception practised on animal-breeding and dairying pro- 
ducers; and  H.-B.  Krohn,  Die  Futtergetreidewirtschaft  der  Welt  1900-1954  (Hamburg/Berlin, 
I957),  especially p. 37. On the adverse effect of the maize tariff on the medium-sized producer, see 
U.  Teichmann, Die Politik de,  Agrarpreisstutzun7g  (Cologne, I955),  p.  203. 840  DAVID  BLACKBOURN 
small producers  were subsistence-based,  with a minimal interest in the market.66 
In fact, this was not the case, and the extent of small-scale production for the 
market is clear from official sources. In Gmiind the marketable surplus in I870 
from the I30  households  of Iggingen  was 1,500  bushels  of spelt,  I30  of barley 
and 40  of rye. In Degerfeld,  also in Gmiind and consisting of 55 households, 
it was reported that ' 200-300  bushels of spelt and 250-350  bushels of oats in 
excess of domestic consumption can annually be sold o-utside  '.Y In G6ggingen 
the pattern was similar, and prevailed, according to the Gmn  nder  Tagblatt, 
beyond the turn of the century.68  In reply to an inquiry of  I895,  the district of 
Bergatreute  in Waldsee (where all three main grains were cultivated) calculated 
the annual loss to its producers  from the price drop at 32,000  M:  only I7  out of 
23I  households needed to purchase all their flour and bread; 65 produced at 
least part of their requirements; 48 were self-sufficient; and ioi  had a surplus 
to market.69  There can be no question that the peasant producer had an interest 
in the market price of grain. 
It was, of course, true that German agricultural production was unbalanced, 
and that a greater emphasis on cattle and dairy farming was called for to redress 
the over-production of grain. This,  however, did not dispel the problem that 
the small producer's budget was often finely balanced to include a small profit 
from  spelt,  oats or barley. Nor  did  Progressive and  liberal arguments take 
sufficient account of  the fact that rising costs contributed at least as much as 
falling prices to rural anger. Thus the suggestion that he switch from grain was 
met with  outright suspicion by the small producer, particularly since it came 
from the champions of that rapid industrialization which he held responsible 
for his plight. This  reaction found support among cattle-raisers  who feared a 
glut from over-production or a sudden flood of livestock and meat imports,70 
and among dairy farmers whose apprehensions  were reinforced by concern over 
surrogate foodstuffs. Margarine was  the main enemy  here:  the Ravensburg 
Chamber  of  Commerce,  always  sensitive to  the  moods  of  local  customers, 
reported in  i894  that dairy men were fighting fiercely to check the spread of 
margarine as  a  butter substitute. Feelings  were  sufficiently strong  for  the 
Chamber to take up the movement, and propose -  as the Centre party in the 
Reichstag had done -  that, as a disincentive to the consumer, the offending 
substance be statutorily dyed a distinctive and disagreeable  colour (their sugges- 
tion was violet).7"  Hop growers, concentrated  in the Catholic areas of Tettnang 
66  Biihler, Die  Stellung  Wiiv-ttembergs,  pp.  12,  47-8;  Hardach, Die  Bedeuttung  wvirtschaftlicher 
Faktoren, pp.  I20-I. 
67  Beschreibung des Oberanmts  Gmiind, Herausgegeben vofl  dern Ko6niglichen  Statistisch- topo- 
graphischen  Bureau  (Stuttgart,  I870),  p.  354. 
68  Giniunder Tagblatt, I5  Apr. 1902.  69  WJbb,  ii  (i895),  2^. 
70  WJbb,  II  (I895),  I4,  25;  WJbb, I  (I897),  74.  Horse-raisers  also feared a flood of foreign im- 
ports:  the number of horses imported in  i86o  was  35,000,  in  I874  67,000,  in  I898  I22,000.  For 
reactions  to this, cf. Ipf-Zeitting, I4  Sept. I899. 
71  E.  Schwab, P.  Weiss,  K.  Haltermann, et  al.,  Ioo  Jahre Oberschwiibische  bidustrie- an12d 
Handelskainmer  (Ravensburg, I957),  pp.  58-9.  The  Centre party supported the  I887  ' margarine THE  CENTRE  PARTY  IN  WORTTEMBERG  84I 
and Rottenburg, were also threatened with  a curtailed outlet for their  crops 
when improvements in refrigeration reduced the role of hops as a preservative 
and freed breweries from the compulsion to buy immediately after the harvest.72 
All  these  considerations made it  difficult for  the Progressives to  impress 
with  their  argument  that  peasant prosperity lay  in  diversification. Yet,  as 
working-class complaints about dear food  became more insistent, the  Volks- 
partei was strengthened in its belief that the great Junker estates must be made 
to suffer and the peasant to see sense. As  the gap between town and country 
widened,  the peasantry looked to other parties for a sympathetic hearing, and 
in  the early I89os  matters came to a head. Grain prices dipped disastrously,"3 
and cattle-raisers  were struck by a series of natural disasters, culminating in a 
feedstuffs shortage which reduced stocks by a fifth and cost the peasantry an 
estimated 30-40 million M.74  Liberals bore the brunt of the resentment as many 
cattle owners who h.ad previously resisted were forced to take on debts:  com- 
plaints were rife a-bout  the extortion of Jewish cattle dealers when animals lhad 
to be bought on credit, and liberal legislation was blamed for sanctioning the 
itinerant trade in cattle.75  Above all, the Caprivi trade treaties, supported by the 
Volkspartei,  produced  violent  opposition,  as import  duties  were  reduced  on 
oats,  barley,  malt,  oxen,  calves,  meat  and  hops.  One  beneficiary  of the  crisis  was 
the Wiirttemberg Bauernbund, formed in i893  as a local branch of the agrarian 
Bund  de Landwirte,  and  beginning  to make  headway  in the  Protestant  regions 
of Hohenlohe  and  the  Alb,  which  by  geographical  position,  type  of agriculture 
and  social  structure  were  very  close  to the  Catholic  regions  of the  lagstkreis  and 
Oberschwaben.76  The other  beneficiary  was the Centre  party  itself,  many  of 
law '; demanded heavier taxation on margarine and supported legislation to ban its sale in places 
where butter was sold; was a moving spirit behind the Reichstag committee motion to make mar- 
garine unpopular by dyeing it  ' the (colour) of the oaken wainscoting of the Reichstag building '; 
and  was  a  cosignatory along  with  the  Conservatives and  Anti-Semites of  the  I896  draft bill 
(June I897  law) to subject margarine to even more stringent public health investigations (controls 
over milk and butter were negligible). 
72  Teichmann, Die  Politik der Agrarpreisstiutzung,  p.  638.  Stuttgart was a  major centre botlh 
for  the chemical industry and the manufacture of  sophisticated brewery equipment which could 
make the use of surrogates  like rice possible. 
73  Spelt prices  in I894  were at only ii  M./dz.  WJbb,  ii  (I896),  I22. 
74  K.  Lindeboom,  ' Das  Privatversicherungswesen  ',  V.  Bruns (ed.),  Wfiirttemberg  u.nter der 
Regierung Kdnig  TVil/helms 11 (Stuttgart, I9I6),  p.  9ii;  WJbb, I  (i897),  73. 
75  WJbb, ii  (I895),  I4,  25. The case of one fraudulent Jewislh cattle-dealer in  Ravensburg was 
much discussed in the press, and even carried into the Lower House in  i895  by the energetically 
anti-semitic Centre deputy for  the  area, Theophil Egger.  Cf.  also Friedrich Payer's description 
of  his Agrarian opponent at a by-election in Besigheim at the same period:  ' His campaign was 
not delicate, and portrayals  of  the lawyer (i.e.  Payer -  DGB) having  the mortgaged cow  taken 
away from the despairing peasant  family at the bidding of the Jew played a major part '.  F. Payer, 
Meina  Lebenslauf, typed MS (Stuttgart,  I932),  pp.  35-6. 
76  On  the  similarity of  Hohenlohe  and  the  Alb  to  Oberschwaben, see  E.  Schremmer, Die 
Bauernbefreiung  in  Hohenlohe (Stuttgart, I963),  and M.  K6nig,  Die  bauerliche Ktilturlandschajt 
der Hohen  Schwabenalb (Tiibingen,  I958).  On  the  origins of  the  Bauernibund  in  these  years, 
Oekuonomierat  Rudolph Schmid. Ein Lebensbild  eines tviirttembergischen  Bauernfiih/;ers  (no author, 
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whose candidates in  I895  were already political leaders in  agricultural com- 
munities, or active in local peasant associations.77 
IV 
Support also came to the Centre from the Mittelstand of artisans and shop- 
keepers. Declining  peasant purchasing power brought a spate of bankruptcies 
to small businesses in the Catholic valleys, while simultaneously larger competi- 
tors began to encroach on local markets. Four traditional industries of Ober- 
schwaben were badly affected. Artisan tanneries were hit by the competition of 
cheap imported American leather, and the swallowing up of small businesses 
was well advanced by the middle of the i8gos.78 Shoemakers were also being 
eliminated by the competition of firms like Salamander in  Stuttgart,79  while 
millers faced similar problems, as large concerns in Mannheim and Heidelberg 
threatened  to turn the native industry into a mere distributor  of imported flour.80 
Family based breweries found themselves in the same dilemma. Many of those 
forced out of the producing sector fled to shopkeeping and inkeeping, but it was 
only in the cities that sufficient custom was growing, and in smaller towns these 
occupations were chronically overcrowded. By the i88os there were over 20,000 
tradesmen's  businesses in the state, and the situation was deteriorating.8' In the 
Catholic areas south of the Danube, artisans were encouraged by the presence 
of a growing number of holiday-makers  from the towns to sink their reserves  in 
a shop or inn; but the rate of bankruptcy was high in these trades, in the i88os 
six times as great among innkeepers and publicans as in the building industry, 
for example.82 
If artisans  and shopkeepers  often proved to be their own worst enemies, they 
naturally found  others to blame for  their problems:  large firms, with  their 
control over raw materials  and economies of scale; the department  stores, which 
enticed labour and customers out of the small towns and encroached on local 
markets; and the  men  who  framed the  liberal commercial code, which  en- 
couraged numerous practices harmful to  the Mittelstand, from  price-cutting 
wars and the spread  of automatic vending machines, to the rising sales of bottled 
beer so anathematized by publicans. A  changing Volkspartei was as unsympa- 
thetic to  these complaints as to  those of  the peasantry. Thirty  years before, 
77  For example, Xaver Rathgeb, landholder and mayor in Ellwangen; Johannes Schick, mayor 
of Laupheim;  Theophil Egger, secretary  of the Ravensburg  Agricultural  League; Franz-Xaver  Krug, 
mayor of Biberach and chairman of the local agricultural  loan bank. 
78  Bartens, Die  wirtschaftliche  Entwictlung  des Konigreichs Wiirttemberg,  p.  iIo. 
9  In  i882,  there were two large shoe factories in  Wiirttemberg; in  I895  twenty.  By the time 
of  the war, Jacob Sigle's Salamander factory in the Kornwestheim suburb of  Stuttgart employed 
3,400  workers. 
80  See the petition of small millers, 34 LT,  Beilage Band 777,  Beilage 167,  483. 
81  WJbb, i  (I893),  I43;  and cf.  the speeches of  the deputies Schmidt (Maulbronn)  in  34  LT, 
PB IV,  pp.  3529-30,II3  Sitz,  Io  May I900,  and Schumacher  (Spaichingen) in 35 LT,  PB IV,  p. 
2683,  I23  Sitz,  8 Aug.  1902,  on  the chronic  overcrowding  in  this  sector. 
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Wiirttemberg's liberals had been men of the Mittelstand, small-town booksellers 
and pharmacists  lk;  but the Volspartei  candidates for the i895  election included 
a  bevy  of  'Manchester  men'  representing manufacturing and  commercial 
interests:  the  banker Schaidt,  the  merchants Lang,  Betz,  Schumacher and 
Schweickhardt, the factory owners Biirk, Kass, Hahnle, Beuerlen, Henning and 
Kraut, the large-scale miller Schmid, and the brewery owner Tag. The party's 
leaders had  also changed. Most were now  lawyers with  strong business ties. 
Friedrich Payer sat with  1Hans  Hahnle  on  several boards, and the two men 
between them held eight  different directorships.84  The  Haussmann brothers, 
Conrad and Friedrich, with their respective brothers-in-law,  made up a closely- 
knit group with multiple commercial  interests  in Stuttgart,  Esslingen, Geislingen 
and Reutlingen.85  The advent of Payer and the Haussmanns to the leadership  of 
the Volkspartei  in the late  i88os  pointed  up the  party's  growing  inability  to speak 
for Mittelstand  discontent,  and from 1895 there  was a steady  drift  of these 
groups  towards  the  Centre  and  Bauernbund,  and  a whittling  away  of Progres- 
sive  seats  in small-town  constituencies. 
The changing  nature  of liberalism  also  stirred  the  Catholic  political  elite  out 
of  its complacency.  For  the  forceful  young  Volksprartei  leaders  were  not  attached 
to laissez-faire  out  of narrow  self-interest:  the  local  success  of men  like  Robert 
Bosch  and  Gottfried  Daimler  encouraged  them  in a buoyant  optimism  about 
the public  benefits  of entrepreneurial  initiative,  and its power  to lift men 
socially.8'  Just  as laissez-faire  had proved  its superiority  over ancient  guild 
restrictions,  so it would  act  as a leaven  on the  inherited  rigidities  of stdnidisc/z 
society.  The political  corollary  of this faith  was a demand  that  government 
recognize  the social  importance  of the co-mmercial  and professional  nmiddle 
classes.  In Berlin  each  liberal  leader  hoped  that  Chancellor  Caprivi  could  be 
persuaded  to play  Peel  to his Cobden.  Wiirttemberg's  Progressives  had  sounder 
83  See the lives  of  Volkspartei politicians, in  Schmidt-Buhl, Schtviibische Volksinianner. 
84  In Mein Lebenslatf, Payer calculated his annual income from such sources by  I9I7  as more 
than 40,000  M. 
85  Conrad Haussmann, a  true free-trade liberal, was characteristically  interested in  canal and 
railway projects, where many of  his own  advisory positions were.  His  role as  intermediary be- 
tween government and contractors  in  the Neckar Canal project can be followed  in  detail in  his 
papers at the Stuttgart Hauptstaatsarchiv,  Nachlass Haussmann, 147/0O4. These Volkspartei con- 
nections with big business and commerce were a powerful political weapon in the hands of Centre 
and  Conservatives. Cf.  the  Bauernbttnd pamphlet An  die  Landtagswiihler der  Oberaintsbezirk 
Miinsingen (n.d.,  igo6?); and Deuitsches  Volksblatt,  3 Dec.  I906. 
86  Bosch was a close friend and political supporter of  Conrad Haussmann. The  entrepreneurial 
myth  was  especially strong  in  Wiirttemberg, where  so  many  dramatic personal case-histories 
seemed to prove the truth of it:  Daimler, risen from Cannstatt  baker's son; Sigle from shoemaker 
to  head of  Salamander; Ernst Junghans from  master watchmaker to  entrepreneur with  world 
markets; Voith, expanding the family locksmith's shop in Heidenheim to an enterprise  capable of 
supplying the turbine engines installed at Niagara Falls. See W.  Zorn, ' Typen und Entwicklungs- 
krafte deutschen Unternehmertums  ',  in K. E.  Born (ed.), Moderne denttsc/he  Wirtschaftsgeschichte 
(Cologne/Berlin, I966),  pp.  36,  429;  W.  Ehmcr, Siidwestdeutschland  als EinAheit  tnoid  Wirtschalfts- 
roatm  (Stuttgart,  I930),  pp-  48-9,  53,  55. 844  DAVID  BLACKBOURN 
cause to be sanguine: before the I895 election ministers already  had plans drawn 
up  for  the modernization of  the constitution, tax structure and educational 
system, and the liberal state bureaucracy  seemed amenable to reform.87 
The threat  from the Volkspartei  brought together the aspirations  of the strug- 
gling  Catholic communities and the apprehensions of their potenti.al leaders. 
Prominent Catholics viewed with distaste the;prospect  of future political leader- 
ship by such self-consciously Cobdenite liberals:  it  could only accelerate the 
division of society into the wealthy, capitalist  few, and the rootless, property-less 
many. Like many Cen.tre  leaders in other parts of the Reich their object was to 
retain a society frozen in its comfortable standisch mould, and they hoped to 
achieve this by building up the Mittelstand of moderate property-owners  into a 
conservative bulwark against the excesses of liberal individualism on the one 
hand, and the growing  threat of socialist collectivization on the other.88  This 
concern made the future leaders of the Wiirttemberg Centre party as sensitive 
as their supporters  to the details of government policy. Decisions on the distri- 
bution of the fiscal burden, or on canal and railway construction, were scruti- 
nized for their effect on the fate of the Mittelstand; believing that they were 
engaged in a struggle to define the character  of the state for a generation to come, 
they were able to turn apparently neutral questions -  like a change in postal 
charges  -  into fierce  ideological battles. 
The  shared apprehensions of supporters and leaders were most evident in 
I895  on the issue of education. The burden of taxation was already a sensitive 
issue in rural areas, and educational reform would entail either new expenditure 
for indebted Gemeinde, or the removal of control  along with the financial  burden 
from the local community. The  general education encouraged by government 
and liberals alike was also widely condemned:  subjects like foreign languages 
were thought to raise children's expectations, and incite them to desert practical 
pursuits on the farm or in the workshop in favour of a white-collar job in the 
town. An unwelcome sign of social mobility had alrealdy  antagonized artisans, 
whose apprentices were being attracted to skilled and well-paid factory jobs 
after enrolling in government-sponsored  courses in technical education.89  The 
proposal  to raise the school-leaving  age by a year focused a number of objections: 
it would stretch local financial resources,  and strike hard at the Mittelstand and 
peasantry  by diminishing the supply of family labour on which they increasingly 
depended.90 
87  Relations between liberals and government were by no means smooth in  these years, but a 
combination of Payer's conciliatory gifts, and the flexibility of Prime Minister von Mittnacht and 
ministers like von Pischek, enabled a degree of  co-operation between politicians and government 
unique in Wilhelmine Germany. Cf.  Simon, Die  wiirttembergischen  Demokraten, p.  49 ff. 
88  Cf. Centre programme, J. Eckard (ed.), Politische Zeitfragen in  Wiirttemberg,  iv  (Stuttgart, 
I900),  i-6. 
89  Complaints of  this kind filled the local Centre press. One of  the  objects of  the  1897  guild 
legislation in the Reich was to return more control over apprentices  to the master. 
90 An  inquiry of  I904  showed that out of  300,000  children of  school  age,  70,000  worked in THE  CENTRE  PARTY  IN  WORTTEMBERG  845 
For the Catholic elite, education had always been regarded as a major battle- 
field against the Enlightenment; industrial development and the rise of modern 
class society sharpened its significance. The  political education of the working 
class by the SPD  was an alarming state of affairs. Even more serious was the 
willingness of the state to assume control over education in urban areas, where 
pressure  of numbers had exposed the inadequacy of clerical resources.  More than 
just clerical control was at stake here. The spread of public educational provision 
weakened  the rights of  the Familienvater over his  children, and  gave  tacit 
official approval to full-blooded industrialization, under which  husband and 
wife  entrusted their offspring to  the state and went  off to  the factory. The 
proliferation of state schools and training colleges for teachers, together with 
rising  teachers' salaries, brought  a  further  problem:  it  promoted  conflict 
between Catho,lic  teachers,  who now tended to see 'themselves  more as members 
of a professional corps, and a clerical control over education which seemed to 
block  their avenues to  promotion.9' To  Catholic leaders this was  a graphic 
illustration of that' war of all against all' which liberalism  provoked, and which 
a major instalment of reform would exacerbate. 
Liberals, then, were encouraging a social and intellectual ferment from which 
only the SPD could ultimately benefit. This was the argument which convinced 
future Centre party leaders. The lapse of Bismarck's anti-socialist  law at the end 
of  i89o,  and  the continued absence of  the  teaching orders in  Wiirttemberg 
could only harden this feeling, and the example olf  Probst's  conduct in these years 
is an illuminating one. In January I889 Gr6ber was still recording doubts in his 
diary as to whether Probst, as Wuirttemberg's  leading Catholic politician, would 
ever be willing to lead a Centre party in the state.92  His volte-face dated from the 
fo,llowing year, when the SPD  was freed from Bisrmarck's  laws, and the party 
at its Halle conference singled out the Centre as its particular  enemy. Less than 
a month later Probst was in the chair at a meeting in Ulm, helping to set up a 
committee to put pressure on the government over the return of  the banned 
orders and safeguards for confessional schools.93  The  meetings with ministers 
and the mass petition organized by Probst and the Ulm co,mmittee  put forward 
one central proposition: in their schools policy, the liberals were 'going  lhand 
in hand with the Social Democrats and Anarchists  '.`  It was this which drove 
some form of paid agricultural  employment, nearly half as domestic servants. When this is added 
to  the  number working  unpaid,  the  universal pattern in  Oberschwaben, it  can  be  seen  how 
powerful an interest the larger peasant proprietor  had in restricting educational expansion. 
91 A  meeting of  the Catholic Teachers Association at Ravensburg, in  I9OI,  was to  pass a  set 
of  ' Theses '  deploring the frustrations which attended the efforts of  its members to  rise  in  the 
profession. Politische Zeitfragen, 9,  p.  I44.  Eight  years later a  Jagsttreis local meeting  of  the 
same body was so incensed by the  ' clerical block '  that it  voted full  support to the  Volksparetei 
educational spokesman, Lochner -  who was a freemason. Detitsches Volksblatt, 9 Jan. I909. 
92  Cardauns,  Adolph Grober,  p. 65. 
93  Bachem, Vorgeschichte,  Geschichte  und Politik, viii,  67. 
94  Probst speech at Ochsenhausen, reported in Detntsches  Volksblatt, 12  Jan. i895. 846  DAVID  BLACKBOURN 
Probst to leave the left group in the Landtag in  I893,  after a life-long political 
association.95 
V 
How  far was  the Centre party which  Gr6ber, Probst and others now  began 
to  build,  acting  on  this  issue  simply  as  the  political  arm  of  the  Church? 
Certainly in  Wiirttemberg,  as in  the  rest of  the  Reich,  the  Church as  an 
institution was not so compromised as, for example, it was in France by past 
association  with the tithe, or present  identification with aristocracy  and privilege. 
It could plausibly claim that the liberals were the main threat to peasant lands 
and livelihoods. But nmore  important -than  this, the Church in France gained a 
political foothold among the peasantry and artisans through the organizations 
of parish priests at the local level; whereas Ralliement, backed by the hierarchy 
as a national political movement, 'was a failure. In Germany, the politicians of 
the Centre party never allowed the hierarchy either to obstruct or to lead their 
movement. Forging a political weapon which relied heavily from the outset on 
the local clergy, they proved infinitely more successful than de Mun or Lamy. 
In Probst's case, the roots of his independence from the hierarchy were as 
venerable as -his  liberalism: he was, and remained, a disciple of Montalembert. 
Gr6ber represented the new school of Centre politicians which emergeid  in the 
I89os.  He,  like his mentor Windthorst, saw both the dangers and weaknesses 
of a political party run by Rome or the German bishops. From the i88os, when 
his political activity in Rottweil brought a clash with  the local seminary head, 
he refused to be deflected by the clerical displeasure  he provoked.96  His relations 
with successive incumbents at Rottenburg were especially cool. They preferred 
the discreet lobbying of ministers on specific concessions to the Church, not the 
instigation of a mass party which cut across the lines of their own authority.97 
But  Gr6ber, unwilling  to  see political Catholicism in  Germany become the 
preserve of a rump:  of notables and bishops, followed the course laid down by 
Windthorst, and followed by his own contemporaries  Lieber, Spahn and Trim- 
born. Through the ballot box and by means of an active social policy he intended 
to consolidate a party aimed ideologically at liberals and socialists, conservative 
in its aims but entirely modern in its methods. 
This was the significance of the Volksverein  fur das katlholisclhe  Deutsclhland, 
founded in Wiirttemberg four years before the party itself, and by I895 already 
95  Cardauns,  Adolpi  Gr1ber,  p.  67;  Bachem,  Vorgeschichte,  Geschichte  ossd  Politik,  VIII,  75. 
The deputies Schick (Laupheim), Bueble (Waldsee), Kiene (Ehingen) and  Haug (Ulm) helped to 
complete the  core of the future Centre party -  although Haug subsequently sat instead with  the 
Bauerszbund. 
96  Cardauns,  Adolph Gr8ober,  p. 28. 
97  Bishop Hefele,  for example, wrote to Probst on  30  Oct.  1877, expressing his unwillingness 
to see a Centre  group in the Lower House. Scheuerle,  Der politische Katholizismus in  Wfirttesmberg, 
Appendix iII,  p.  26I;  and cf.  Miller, Eugeni Bolz,  p.  36.  In  the  i88os  Hefele  and  his  assistant 
(later Bishop) Reiser felt  the  founding  of  a  Centre party would  be  ' inopportune '.  Bachem, 
Vorgeschichte, Geschichte and Politik,  viii,  6o-I.  On Gr6ber's poor relations with  Reiser's suc- 
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numbering  20,000  members.98 Windthorst's creation, :the Volkesverein, was 
intended to counter the outmoded policy and informal organization which the 
Centre had inherited from the Kulturkampf era, and to impose the Sozialpolitik 
objectives of  the national party leadership on  the regional idiosyncrasies and 
cleric.al  bias of some south German Catholic movements.99  The organization was 
an invaluable auxiliary of the Centre:  in states where the peasantry and rural 
Mittelstand were suspicious of privilege and ' outside' authority, it served the 
same function as the peasant and artisan associations in  successfully utilizing 
the energies of the  radical lower clergy, who  themselves sprang largely from 
similar social backgrounds. It  was  therefore appropriate that  the  founding 
meeting of the Centre in Wiirttemberg should have taken place at a Volksverein 
meeting in  Ellwangen  on  Whitsunday  I894,  when  the  4,000  present passed 
Gr6ber's resolution to  form  a  political party to  fight  the  coming  Landtag 
elections.100 
The  I895  elections marked a turning-point in  Wiirttemberg politics. The 
parliament which was dissolved in the previous year was little different in com- 
position from its predecessors  in past decades, divided still into an ' anti-govern- 
mental'  Left  and  a  'pro-governmental'  Landespartei. But  these groupings 
reflected the political alignments of  i866-7i,  or even  I848,  not those of  I895. 
As the election showed, the economic and social forces at work in later nine- 
teenth-century Wiirttemberg were too powerful to be contained within  such 
an archaic party structure. The  divisions between classes, between town  and 
country, Agrarians and Industrializers, demanded, and found, direct political 
expression. The  Centre was  only  one  of  the parties which  first enjoyed an 
independent political existen.ce  in the I895 Landtag: both SPD and Bauernbund 
entered the Lower House for the first time, and in a sense this was true of the 
Volkspartei  itself, now freed from uneasy coalition with the other groups inside 
the Left. 
The  weakness of  the  Volkspartei was that it still claimed to represent the 
kleinbirgerlich radicalism of I848,  although both this and its own policies had 
entirely changed by the I89os.  Increasingly its economic policies could only be 
agreeable to those -  like Daimler, Bosch, Junghans, Sigle -  who had succeeded 
in raising themselves out of the Mittelstand:  those who had dropped into the 
dependent working class looked towards the SPD,  while those who struggled 
to maintain their independent existence on the farm or in the workshop were 
more likely  to  turn to  the Centre and Bauernbund. The  i895  election was 
therefore the beginning of a succession struggle over the liberal Volkspartei; 
and in the campaign economic and social issues were placed in the forefront by 
the supporters  and leaders of the other three parties. 
98  Cardauns,  Adolph Grober,  pp.  I04-5. 
99 M.  Spahn, Das deutsche Zentrum (Mainz/Munich, I907),  pp.  8I-2;  T.  Nipperdey, Die  Or- 
ganisation der deutschen Parteien vor  I9I8  (Dusseldorf, I96I),  pp.  28I-2. 
100  Bachem, Vorgeschichte,  Geschichte  und Politik, vIII,  78-9. 848  DAVID  BLACKBOURN 
The Centre campaign retained the emphasis given to it by the first resolution 
passed at the Ellwangen meeting, attacking the laissez-faire  views of the liberals 
and demanding legislation in defence of the peasantry and Mittelstand. This 
was partly a useful lightning-rod against Volkspartei attacks on the ' clerical ' 
Centre; but it  also reflected a real demand from below,  and one which  the 
liberals clearly found embarrassing.10'  Certainly in small-town meetings, press- 
ing material  problems often relegateid  the lofty concerns of the Centre leadership 
to an entirely subsidiary role. At  a meeting in  the Rottweil constituency, the 
schoolteacher  Dietz ' spoke principally about agriculture  and economic questions 
in the light of the Centre programme, and at the close touched briefly on the 
schools and orders question  '102  This  ordering of  priorities could be read in 
countless reports of local papers like the Ipf-Zeituing  or Waldse'er Wolchenblatt. 
'Defence  oif the Church ' slogans played a surprisingly muted part in the cam- 
paign, given the genuine grievances of the Catholics as Catholics, the strongly 
anti-Catholic tenor of the opposition campaign and the importance of the local 
clergy in the electoral  machine. 
VI 
In 1895 the Centre returned with i8 seats,'0'  the Bauernbund with 5 and SPD 
with 2;  the Volkspartei still returned 3i  deputies, the last real success it was 
able to enjoy appealing to the electorate as the historic party of Swabian lower 
middle-class radicalism. But by  I9I2  these strengths had been entirely altered: 
in an enlarged Lower House, Centre and Conservatives, as a Right block, held 
46 seats, the Volkspartei only 23  and the SPD  17.  This final destruction of the 
liberal position, from the  I89os,  was the decisive end of  ' old polhtics' in  the 
state, under which  the  Volkspartei was the natural outlet for kleinbfirgerlich 
dissatisfaction with the established order. It was the culmination of more than 
forty years of social differentiation among the electorate. The liberals were now 
the party of the entrepreneurs  and bankers, of the growing professional groups 
like  teachers and  of  the  ',new  Mittelstand'  of  white-collar workers.104  Its 
101 At an electoral meeting in  the Oehringen constituency, for example, Friedrich Haussmann 
told  his  audience that  he  was  in  favour  of  retaining duties  on  agricultural products at  the 
Caprivi level.  This  was in  flat contradiction to  official party policy; Oehringen was  nevertheless 
lost to the Bauern7bumd. On this,  and the result at Crailsheim, where the Agrarians polled over 
40 per cent of the vote at the first attempt, see Simon, Die wfirtten2bergischen  Demookraten,  p.  42. 
The two  seats were identical in social structure and type of  agriculture practised to  Centre seats 
in the same area, like Neresheim and Ellwangen. 
102  Deutsches Volksblatt, I7  Jan. 1895. 
103  A  note on  the margin of  Centre party victories may be useful here. The  electoral system 
allowed for two ballots, with  a run-off between the top two  candidates if  no  one candidate ob- 
tained an overall majority  on the first ballot. Forty-four of the 7O elected seats to tlhe  Lower House 
were decided on  the first ballot; I6  out of  I8  Centre seats were won  without a run-off. In  the 
Oberschwaben  seats the margin of  first ballot wins  was usually overwhelming:  in  Ehingen,  the 
Centre deputy leader,  Hans  Kiene,  polled  3,44I  votes  out  of  3,5II  cast. These  results were 
achieved on an average turn-out throughout the state of 75 per cent, compared with only 44 per 
cent in I889,  when genuine party competition was much less. 
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residual strength in rural areas rested partly on the comparative prosperity of 
groups like market gardeners, but also on judicious use of the anti-clerical  card 
and a considerable amount of trimming on the tariff issue.105  In working-class 
seats, the SPD  had swept aside the liberals, while  in  the outlying rural con- 
stituencies, Centre and Bauernbutid were  the legatees of  former  Volkspartei 
strength among the peasantry and Mittelstaind. 
Wiirttemberg illustrates the role of the Centre as a political representative  of 
these  classes, appealing to  a ghetto  mentality which  was  as much  social as 
religious in origin. While a liberal like Conrad Haussmann entertained  a certain 
disdain for what he called the 'dark  urges ' of the people, Centre politicians 
were  adept  at  seizing  on  the  most  parochial complaint  about bureaucratic 
Ihauteur,  or the failure of a railway branch line project, and amplifying it as a 
political issue. This gave them a powerful stick with which to beat the liberals; 
and for all the demagogy which this mode of politics entailed, Centre leaders 
were right to see such concerns as symptomatic of a widespread sense of neglect 
among demoralized social groups. The  importance of the Centre at local level 
lay in  its  ability, through party committees, reading rooms, the  Volksverein, 
peasant associations, artisan and shopkeeper co-operatives, to  return to  these 
classes a sense of self-esteem, providing them with a closed world very si;milar 
in its comprehensiveness  and tone to the sealed-off  proletarian  world of the SPD. 
But the political organizations of Centre and SPD, at local and national level, 
ran on parallel rather than convergent lines. The  divisions between the two 
parties corresponded  to those between the mutually exclusive social classes from 
which they drew their support, and whose interests they upheld. For although 
the Centre was by reputation a party embracing all classes, it was disproportion- 
ately strong in the countryside and small towns, and the Catholic working class 
received from it only a fraction of the attention lavished on the peasantry and 
Mittelstand.106  Only  two of  the forty-five deputies who  sat for the Centre in 
the  Wiirttemberg Lower  House  between  I895  and  the war represented this 
interest, and even in the industrial Rhineland and Westphalia the ' left wing' 
of the party showed more enthusiasm for organizing artisans  against proletarian- 
ization than for organizing the workers themselves.107  At Berlin, and in state 
105  In  a  I900  Lower House  division forced by  the  Centre on  a  motion  to  raise tariffs, six 
Volkspartei deputies voted  against their  own  party,  Conrad Haussmann made  an  ambiguous 
defence of  free trade, and only  Carl Betz  maintained the  old  liberal hostility to  tariffs of  anly 
kind. In Geislingen and G6ppingen, Volkspartei  local councillors -  one a businessman dealing in 
agricultural  implements  -  voted approval  of even higher tariffs. 
106  In Bavaria, where three-quarters  of  the total population was Catholic, Hertling could still 
describe the  Bavarian Centre as the  party of  ' grain  tariffs and  compulsory guilds '  Hertling, 
Erinn7erungen, II,  54. 
107  The  social  ideas of  Franz Hitze,  of  the  ' realist'  left  wing  of  the  party, were  straight- 
forwardly corporatist: he foresaw a society organized into seven ' estates ' (Stainde),  with produc- 
tion rigidly controlled. There would be no rootless proletariat, and every member of society would 
be  ' conservative and happy again '  within his own  self-governing Stand. This,  no  less than the 
extreme right-wing  Oberd6rffer  Programme of  the  I89os,  had  its  centre of  gravity among  the 850  DAVID  BLACKBOURN 
parliaments where it enjoyed a pivotal position, the Centre consistently backed 
legislation designed to buttress the small producer against consumer pressure; 
and in its support for ' dear bread ' and its hostility to the consumer co-operative 
movement the Centre ran directly counter to SPD policy. 
It was this which primarily prevented serious co-operation  between the two 
great mass parties  of Wilhelmine Germany, and drew the Centre towards  alliance 
with the Conservatives. It was these two parties which joined forces to support 
the agricultural tariff, outlaw cheap food surrogates, hamper the co-operative 
movement and help  the artisan with  a re-vamped guild  system. Centre and 
Conservative leaders shared a belief that the Mittelstand and peasantry could 
be forged into a political weapon against liberals and socialists. By nurturing 
them as a ' general class ' against the overmighty power of international capital 
on  the one hand, and the threatening growth  of international labour on  the 
other, they could achieve in concrete form what Catholic ideologue Heinrich 
Pesch called a Solidarism of the middle,108  and the nationalist parties on the 
right termed Sclhutz  der nationalen  Arbeit. 
peasantry and Mittelstanid,  not  in  the  working class. Cf.  P.  Jostock, ' Der  soziale Gedanke im 
deutschen Katholizismus',  K.  Hebing and M.  Horst (eds.),  Volk iin  Glau?bent  (Berlin, I933),  pp. 
I43-4. 
108  Ibid.  p. I47. 